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RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN SHAREHOLDER
DERIVATIVE SUITS
The right of trial by jury has its origin deeply rooted in Anglo-Nor-
man legal history and tradition, and is manifested in the United States
by our federal constitution This note will examine the applicability
of this common law right in a shareholder's derivative suit.
The right to trial by jury in the federal courts has been determined by
the use of what has become the "historic test". Under this test the court
examined the issue presented and referred to the common law as it ex-
isted in 1791 in order to determine whether or not the right existed.2
If the cause of action were equitable or statutory, the right to trial by
jury did not exist unless the legislature had specifically provided for it.3
However, more modem issues could not always be firmly placed into
the legal framework of the Eighteenth Century. Therefore, the courts
have attempted to draw an analogy between the modem action, and some
similar action from the past. These courts, however, have often run into
problems when they attempted to apply to the Twentieth Century the
jurisprudence which developed in Eighteenth Century England. The
distinctions were not always based upon a well-planned or reasoned sys-
tem of law and equity. The two systems were the result of centuries of
struggle between the common law courts and the Lord Chancellor, each
trying to prevent injustice while at the same time maintaining or in-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VII:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by ajury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a):
The right to trial by jury declared in the Seventh Amendment to the Consti-
tution or as given by statute of the United States shall be preserved to the
parties inviolate.
The Seventh Amendment creates no new right to trial by jury. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 38.08[6] at 90 (2d ed. 1951).
2. Parson v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
3. Id.
4. Under the English system, actions under the common law were entitled to ajury trial, while those under equity jurisdiction were only tried before the Chancellor.
5 MOORE 38.02[1], at 8-9. This was more than a procedural difference since there
were actually two separate court systems deriving their authority and influence from
different sources. 2 MOORE 2.03; James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions,
72 Yale L.J. 655 (1963). The American courts maintained the law and equity dis-
tinctions, and actions were fitted into one or the other by analogy to some historical
counterpart. Of course this could, and did, lead to a great amount of overlap and
confusion as to their respective jurisdictions.
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creasing their powers and influence. Many times, the battle for power
between Parliament and the Crown was the motivating force behind the
various changes and developments in the English legal system.5 The
United States is one of the last surviving beneficiaries of this legacy, for,
indeed, even England has largely repudiated the system, and has dis-
carded the jury trial in all but about 2.5% of its civil cases.6
The federal courts have tried to eliminate some of the resulting waste
and overlap found in the dual system by merging the separate proce-
dures so that legal and equitable issues can be tried together in one "civil
action."7  The general procedure now adopted is to look to the basic
nature of the issue.8  If the issue is basically legal in nature, then the jury
right attaches with any equitable issues being tried by the court.9 If the
basic nature of the issue is equitable, the court will decide all the is-
sues, 10 even the incidental legal ones. However, where the case con-
tains both separate legal and equitable issues where one cannot be con-
sidered incidental to the other, the problem of trial sequence arises, be-
cause a prior determination of facts in the equitable portion of the pro-
ceedings may estop further adjudication of any legal issues in a subse-
quent jury trial.1 Thus the right to trial by jury could be circum-
5. For an excellent historical background discussion concerning the right to
trial by jury see James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 Yale L.J. 655 (1963).
Also see 5 MOORE 38.02[1] [2].
6. 15 DePaul L. Rev. 403 (1966); JUDICIAL STATIsTIcs, ENGLAND AND WALES, 1969:
Civil Judicial Statistics 13 (1970).
7. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1:
These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all
suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in
admiralty, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 2:
There shall be one form of action to be known as "civil action."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a):
A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim, may join either as independent or as alternate
claims either legal or equitable or maritime, as he has against an opposing
party.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a):
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending be-
fore the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all of the mat-
ters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid
unnecessary costs or delays.
8. 5 MOORE 38.16 (2d ed.).
9. Dickinson v. General Acc. Fire & Assur. Corp., 147 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1945);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Saxe, 134 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
10. Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948);
Beaunit Mills Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1942); Reliable
Mach. Works, Inc. v. Unger, 144 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). See also Morris,
Jury Trial under the Federal Fusion of Law and Equity, 20 Texas L. Rev. 427 (1942).
11. Hopkins v. Lee, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 109 (1821). Partmar Corp. v. Paramount
Pictures Theatres Corp., 347 U.S. 89 (1954). See also, Developments in the Law-Res
Judicata, 65 Harvard L. Rev. 289 (1960).
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vented by joining a legal issue with an equitable issue, if the equitable
issue were tried first.12
In order to handle this problem the federal courts have used various
procedures.' 3 Traditionally, the courts would decide the equitable issues
first. Then any remaining legal issues would be tried before a jury,'4
unless the legal issues were deemed incidental, in which case the court
would also settle these legal issues under the "clean up" doctrine.' 5
As mentioned before, this procedure presents the problem of estoppel
due to the prior determination of the facts by the court. 6
A second solution would be to try the legal issues first,' 7 thus pre-
serving the right to trial by jury. However, this introduces an element
of inflexibility into the system because there may be cases where some
equitable action should be taken before a jury decision is made on the
legal issues.
A third solution would be to give the courts discretionary power to
set the order of trial, basing their decision on the facts of the particular
case.' 8  This would leave the determination of the right to a jury trial
to the wisdom of the court, a situation which may not be very satisfactory
to those desiring consistency and certainty in the law. It is interesting
to note that while we rely on the wisdom of the courts to tell us when
our Constitutional rights have been violated, we do not allow them to use
that wisdom in a discretionary manner.
The Supreme Court has considered this problem and has established
a procedure which provides that a separate law/equity determination will
be made for each issue presented, and that legal issues will be tried first.
In Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 9 the plaintiff sought both an in-
12. However, joinder of claims should not effect a waiver of a jury trial. Leimer
v. Woods, 196 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1952); Ring v. Spina, supra note 10.
13. See Comment, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 289 (1960).
14. American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937); Liberty Oil Co. v.
Condon National Bank, 260 U.S. 235 (1922); Mather v. Ford Motor Co., 40 F. Supp.
589 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
15. An action "once properly in a court of equity for any purpose will ordinarily be
retained for all purposes, even though the court is thereby called upon to determine
legal rights that otherwise would not be within the range of its authority."
McGowan v. Parish, 237 U.S. 285, 296 (1915).
16. The Supreme Court has consistently demonstrated the importance of this prob-
lem in determining if there is a right to trial by jury. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221
(1963); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S.
106 (1891); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
17. Bruckman v. Holzer, 152 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1946).
18. 5 MooRE, 39.12, at 729.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b):
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice . . . may or-
der a separate trial of any claim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, or of any
separate issue or of any number of claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, third-
party claims, or issues. ...
19. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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junction to prevent the defendant from bringng an anti-trust action, and
a declaratory judgment. The defendant answered and counterclaimed
for treble damages under the anti-trust laws and demanded a jury trial
on the factual issues. The trial court held that the issues were pri-
marily equitable and ordered the case to be tried before the court. This
ruling was upheld on the initial appeal where the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the 9th Circuit stated that the right of trial by jury is deter-
mined by looking at the complaint as a whole, and that the complaint
was for injunctive relief which was historically equitable. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the anti-trust issues were cognizable in
law, the parties had a right to a jury trial on these legal issues and that
the legal issues must be tried first. The Court said,
[T]hat only under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances
which in view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we
cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of legal issues
be lost through prior determination of equitable claims. 20
The Court extended this doctrine in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,21
where the plaintiff sought an injunction and an accounting in equity for
breach of a contract under which defendant had the right to use plain-
tiff's registered tradename. The Court held that the action was basically
for damages for breach of contract and that "the constitutional right to
trial by jury cannot be made to depend upon the choice of words in the
pleading. ' 2   The Court went on to say that the right to a jury trial on
the legal issues could not be lost even where the legal issues could prop-
erly be characterized as incidental to equitable issues.23
The rationale used by the Court in both of these decisions was based
upon the premise that in both suits there were combinations of separ-
able legal and equitable issues. Under prior practice equity would have
20. Id. at 510-11. The effect of the Beacon Theaters decision has been to limit the
use of discretion to remove the legal issue from a jury trial. The Fifth Circuit
realized this when in a case similar to Beacon it held:
It is therefore immaterial that the case at bar contains a stronger basis for
equitable relief than was present in Beacon Theaters. It would make no
difference if the equitable cause clearly out-weighed the legal cause so that
the basic issue of the case taken as a whole is equitable. As long as any
legal cause is involved the jury right it creates controls. This is the teaching
of Beacon Theaters, as we construe it.
Thermo-stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486, 491 (5th Cir.
1961).
21. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
22. Id. at 477-78.
23. It would seem that equity will suffer from this doctrine. Beacon Theaters, Inc.
v. Westover, supra note 19, at 509:
Thus, the justification for equity's deciding legal issues once it obtains juris-
diction . .. must be re-evaluated in the light of the liberal joinder provisions
of the Federal Rules which allow legal and equitable causes to be brought
and resolved in one civil action.
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taken initial jurisdiction of both cases and, by trying the equitable issues
first, would have estopped any subsequent jury determinations of the le-
gal issues.
Beacon and Dairy Queen have removed the problem of loss of the
right to a jury determination through estoppel by requiring that the le-
gal issues be tried by a jury and the equitable issues subsequently de-
termined by the court. 24  But it must be remembered that the develop-
ment of the jury right in Beacon and Dairy Queen applied only to his-
torically separable legal and equitable issues that joined together under
the merged system of procedure. They say nothing about a cause of ac-
tion that is unitary in nature and found historically cognizable only in
equity.
Thus, the procedure for the judicial determination of the right to a
jury trial is as follows. First, the parties file their complaints, an-
swers, counterclaims and crossclaims. Then the court examines each
separate issue, together with the relief sought, and makes a determina-
tion of any right to a jury trial based on the relation of the issue and
the remedy to the common law as it had progressed up to 1791. Once
this is done, the court will order a jury trial for the legal issues first,
then a court trial for the equitable issues. Equity jurisdiction be-
comes subserviant to the law, so that the cherished right to trial by jury
is preserved-and in some cases "preserved" where it had never existed
before.
Ross v. Bernhard,2 is a recent United States Supreme Court de-
cision which carries this approach to the extreme. In this case, the
Court was presented with a derivative suit, a creation of equity, and al-
lowed a jury trial on the legal issues presented by the corporation's cause
of action, theorizing that had the corporation itself brought suit, it would
have enjoyed the right to a jury trial on any legal issues involved. In
broad terms, the Court treated the derivative suit as a possible combina-
tion of both legal and equitable issues. Because the shareholders have
an equitable right to sue in the name of the corporation if the corpo-
ration fails to act, the shareholders' right to sue is the equitable issue,
and the corporation's right is the second issue which entitles the parties
to a jury trial if the corporate right proves to be legal in nature.2 6 Thus,
applying the doctrine laid down in Beacon and Dairy Queen, the Court
24. Now a prior determination of the legal issues may estop further equitable de-
terminations. Thus the problem of estoppel is not removed, it is merely reversed.
25. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
26. At law the corporation is regarded as a unit; and at law, therefore, individual
shareholders may not sue although damage to the corporation necessarily has reduced
the value of the interest of each shareholder. The complaint of a shareholder is
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took a single equitable cause of action, split it, and treated the two
parts as separable legal and equitable issues with the right to trial by
jury carefully "preserved."
Historically, a shareholder's derivative suit was a creation of the equity
courts,27 because the common law did not provide an adequate remedy
for the distressed shareholder. Early English courts allowed the share-
holder of a corporation to sue the corporation for breach of its fiduciary
duty to the owners. This was the "trust theory" that was later followed
by the American courts in the early Nineteenth Century.2" The cor-
poration was considered as the trustee for the shareholder beneficiaries,
and it was, therefore, held to be liable to them either for mismanagement
of the business or for the breach of a fiduciary duty. However,
where the corporation itself had a legal cause of action against a third
party and either failed or refused to act, the shareholders were power-
less in any effort to force the corporation to act.
The derivative suit evolved in equity, starting with the trust theory,
and later expanding into cases involving shareholders and third parties.
While equity allowed the shareholders to sue third parties derivatively
in order to enforce their rights, the theory was beginning to change
from that of trustee-beneficiary action to that of a dual action, one for
the shareholder and one for the corporation. 29  Although the corpo-
ration's action could be founded in either law or equity, the equity
court retained jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, in Cohen v. Bene-
ficial Industrial Loan Corp.0 put it this way:
maintainable in equity, where it has been recognized almost since the beginnings of
the business corporation. 2 HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE sec. 711 at
191 (1959). LATTIN, CORPORATIONS ch. 2 § 11 (1970); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 10
(2d ed. 1949). STEVENS also follows the dual analysis of derivative actions in sec. 170.
27. Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947); Prunty, The
Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 980 (1957);
Glenn, The Stockholder's Suit--Corporate and Individual Grievances, 33 Yale L.J. 580
(1924).
28. Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. R. 222 (N.Y. 1832), is the American case
considered the first shareholder's derivative suit. This case was based on dictum by
Chancellor Kent in Attorney-General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns Ch. R. 371 (N.Y.
1817), where he said:
The persons who, from time to time, exercise the corporate powers may, in
their character of trustees, be accountable to this Court for a fraudulent
breach of trust; and to this plain and ordinary head of equity, the jurisdiction
of the Court over corporations ought to be confined, at 389.
Robinson applied this when it said:
The directors are the trustees or managing partners, and the stockholders are
the cestui que trusts, and have a joint interest in all the property and effects
of the corporation. And no injury to the stockholders may sustain by a
fraudulent breach of trust can, upon the general principles of equity, be suf-
fered to pass without a remedy. at 232.
See also Taylor v. The Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831); and 4 POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1095 (1941).
29. Koster v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co., supra note 27 at 522-523; Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). See also 4 POMEROY, supra note 28, at 278.
30. 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
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Equity came to the relief of the stockholder, who had no stand-
ig to bring a civil action at law against faithless directors and man-
agers. Equity, however, allowed him to step into the corporation's
shoes and to seek in its right the restitution he could not demand on
his own.8 '
Today, the ability of the shareholders to enforce the corporate right,
when management has failed to take action, is the essence of the share-
holder's derivative suit. The right to sue or act on behalf of the corpo-
ration does not belong directly to the shareholders,812 but is derivative
or secondary. 8 The primary legal right belongs to the corporation, but
the equitable right belongs to the beneficial owners of the corporation,
the shareholders.
Before a shareholder can bring this type of action, he must show that
he has requested the corporation to take its own action, that the corpora-
tion has refused, and that he has exhausted all corporate procedures
in his attempt to enforce the corporate right. It must also be shown that
the damage is to the corporation, not to the individual shareholder, and
that the relief sought will go directly to the corporation and not to the
shareholders.8 4
Since the derivative suit was a child of equity, the Seventh Amend-
ment's guaranty of a jury trial had not been applied to these actions.85
Liken v. Shaller, adequately expressed this point when it said:
A stockholder's derivative suit is an invention of the courts of
31. See also Koster v. Lumbermans, supra at note 27; Meyer v. Fleming, 327
U.S. 161, 167 (1946); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Dodge v. Woolsey,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 341-44 (1855). For further information about the equitable
nature of the derivative suit see 3B MOORE 23.1.15 [1].
32. Forbes v. Whitlock, 3 Ed. Ch. 446 (N.Y. 1841), was the first case where a
stockholder sued a third party for a breach of contract entered into with the corpora-
tion. The court would not use the trust theory in this situation, stating that share-
holders "have not such an interest now as entitles them to . . . prosecute on their in-
dividual account," and fearing that such a right "would be attended with endless diffi-
culty and embarrassment." at 447-48. But the court went on to say that shareholders
have a direct right "when the directors, officers or managers, having the control of the
corporation and its affairs, are guilty of misconduct, that amount to a breach of
duty as trustees."
33. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855).
34. Ross v. Bernhard, supra note 25, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
35. United Copper Co. v. Amal. Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 264 (1917). Text
writers have said the following:
LATTIN, ch. 8, § 3.
A derivative action is an invention of courts of equity and may be brought
only in equity whether the corporate cause of action be in law or not. As
far as corporate rights and defenses available against it are in issue, these is-
matter of jury trial, for the case being in equity there is no right to jury trial.
13 FLETCHER Cc. CORP. (Perm. Ed., 1970), § 5931.
An action by individual stockholders making the corporation a party de-
fendant is equitable in nature, and plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial as
a matter of right.
Pomeroy, supra note 28 and MooRE, § 38.38(4), both find that the derivative suit is
an equitable action and therefore find there is no right to a trial by jury.
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equity and is recognizable only in equity and cannot be main-
tained at law. . .. Even if the claim, if sued directly by the cor-
poration, would be an action at law, yet, if enforced by means of a
stockholder's derivative suit, it is prosecuted by an action in
equity. 36
Until DePinto v. Provident Security Life Insurance Co.,3 7 this area
of the law seemed well settled. In DePinto the Court of Appeals for
the 9th Circuit held there was a right to a trial by jury on any of the legal
issues between the parties. No federal or state court had ever made such
a ruling before. In DePinto, the shareholders accused the directors of
fraud, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty in purchasing worth-
less shares of another corporation. The shareholders filed a timely de-
mand for a jury trial, but when they later tried to withdraw this mo-
tion, the defendant objected contending it had the right of trial by jury.
The trial court reserved judgment on the motion and impaneled an ad-
visory jury. After the jury returned its verdict for $20,000, the court
entered its own verdict for $314,794.19, ruling that the derivative
suit was an equitable cause of action where there was no right to a jury
trial. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial,
holding that a right to trial by jury exists in shareholder derivative
suits.
The court admitted that the shareholder's derivative suit was founded
in equity, but it used the conceptual approach of the dual nature of
the action to transform it into an action at law. The shareholders can
come into court because of their equitable right to protect their bene-
ficial interest in the corporation. Once there, the court will look at the
nature of the individual issues that are presented in the corporation's
stead. Then, applying the rulings of Beacon and Dairy Queen, the court
said that any of the legal issues presented, whether primary or incidental
would be entitled to be tried by a jury.
No court had followed this reasoning until Ross v. Bernhard.8
There the plaintiff accused the directors of gross abuse of trust, gross
misconduct, wilful misfeasance, bad faith, and gross negligence, and
sought an accounting. While the district court allowed the plaintiffs
demand for a jury trial on the factual issues, the circuit court on an
interlocutory appeal reversed, and held that there is no right to a trial
by jury in a shareholder's derivative suit. The Supreme Court re-
versed, affirming the district court by applying the reasoning of De-
Pinto. The Court held:
36. 64 F. Supp. 432, 441 (N.D. Iowa 1946).
37. 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963) (Cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964).
38. Supra note 25.
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[T]he right to jury trial attaches to those issues in derivative actions
as to which the corporation, if it had been suing in its own right,
would have been entitled to a jury.3 9
The Court said that the Seventh Amendment right is applicable to any
individual issue in a derivative suit which is legal in nature. It reached
this decision by using the conceptual approach of the dual nature of
the shareholder's derivative suit to split the action into its supposedly
separable legal and equitable elements. The derivative suit, even
though created and heretofore administered by the equity courts, was no
longer a single unitary action. It is now to be considered two separable
actions; one in equity, to allow the shareholder in court, and one for
the corporate right which could be either legal or equitable. Once the
court has ruled on the propriety of the shareholder's right to sue, the
court then examines all of the claims existing between the corporation
and third parties just as if the corporation itself had brought the ac-
tion. Any legal issue will be tried by a jury, before any equitable issue
is determined by the court, in accordance with the holdings of Beacon
and Dairy Queen.
As the minority in Ross said:
Somehow the Amendment and the Rules magically interact to do
what each separately was intended not to do, namely, to enlarge the
right to a jury trial in civil actions brought in the courts of the United
Staies. 40
The majority claimed the merged system merely removes a procedural
obstacle that before merger had prevented a jury trial.
The end result may or may not appeal to the reader, but it does seem
to be based on an insecure foundation. Had the derivative suit been a
combination of two separable causes of action, one legal and one
equitable, there would be no problem. The case would fit squarely
within the guidelines set down in Beacon and Dairy Queen. However,
the fact of the matter is that the derivative suit is viewed historically as
a single action, created by the equity court because of an inadequate
remedy at law. Procedural obstacles did not keep the suit out of the
law courts-such suits simply were not recognized. The idea that issues
of fact must be decided by a chancellor is nothing new in equity, it is
a practical reality.
The Ross case goes further in granting the right to a jury trial than
did Beacon Theaters or Dairy Queen. In these cases both historically
legal and equitable relief was sought. The issues involved would have
39. Id. at 532-33.
40. Id. at 543.
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been tried at law if only the legal relief were sought or in equity if only
the equitable relief had been requested. The combination of the two
forms of relief in one action caused the problem because historically
each would have been treated differently, and the Court was concerned
lest the joinder of an equitable claim with a legal one impede the right
to a jury trial on that issue.
In Ross, on the other hand, there is no question but that historically
the whole case would have been tried in equity. Nevertheless, the Court
divided the case into two issues, the shareholder's right to sue and the
corporation's cause of action, and finding the corporation's cause of ac-
tion to be legal determined that the right to a jury trial applied to it.
In Beacon and Dairy Queen there was a need to separate the issues be-
cause the actions involved a combination of historically separable suits,
while in Ross there was a historically unitary equitable action. Yet the
Court used the same issue approach although the need which led to its
adoption in Beacon and Dairy Queen was not present. 41
As the dissent correctly states, the difficulty with the issue approach
is that many issues could be historically equitable or legal, depending
on the action brought.42 It is this disregard of the nature of the action
and the adoption of an issue approach in all cases which leads the dis-
sent to conclude the Court has not "preserved" but extended the right to
a jury trial, and to express fears that in other historically unitary legal
actions, such as actions solely for an injunction (involving a cause of
action which would be tried by a jury if damages had been sought), the
Court would now require a jury trial on the underlying issue and a court
determination restricted solely to the question of whether the issuance
of the equitable remedy was appropriate. It is, however, submitted
that on this latter point the fears of the dissenters are probably unwar-
ranted and the impact of the decision will not extend as far as feared
by the dissent. The Opinion of the Court, in a footnote, indicated the
remedy sought and pre-merger custom are two of three factors to be
considered in determining if an issue is legal or equitable.43 It seems
that the case is properly restricted to situations where, like a derivative
action, a legal remedy is sought in the context of an action which for
historical reasons was cognizable only in equity.
The state courts have consistently followed the traditional equitable ap-
proach to the derivative suit; and, when the question has been raised,
41. The Court had also previously used an issue approach in declaratory judgment
actions, where the action was historically neither legal nor equitable. Beacon Theaters,
supra note 19; Simler v. Conner, supra note 16.
42. 396 U.S. at 549-50.
43. Id. at 538; note 10.
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they have denied the claimant the right to trial by jury." Many states,
including Illinois have not considered the question presented in Ross v.
Bernhard, but in practice they have allowed the derivative suit to be
heard only as one historically cognizable in equity and not at law.
In Illinois, the historical background of the derivative suit closely paral-
lels the development within the Federal system. The Illinois courts
originally viewed the corporation as a trustee of the shareholder's bene-
ficial interests, owing a fiduciary duty to the shareholders." For a
breach of this duty, the shareholder had a cause of action against the
corporation in equity. Eventually the Illinois courts allowed the share-
holders to enforce corporate rights against third parties. Again, share-
holders were required to show that they had made a just demand for
action, that the demand had been refused, and that all other corporate
remedies had been exhausted.4 6
It is important to remember that the shareholder's derivative suit was
a creation of equity, and not the common law. In Mcllvaine v. City Na-
tional Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, the court said:
Normally a cause of action accruing to a corporation is to be en-
forced by the corporation itself, whether by an antitrust law or a
suit in equity. Stockholders cannot ordinarily maintain a suit to en-
force any right of the corporation. There is no common law right
in the stockholders or creditors to sue derivatively in the name of a
corporation. The privilege of maintaining derivative suits has been
accorded to stockholders and creditors, whenever the corporation,
either actually or virtually, refused to institute or prosecute a cause
of action. Then in order to prevent a failure of justice equity will
permit a suit to be brought and maintained by a stockholder or
stockholders substituting or subrogating them for the benefit of the
corporation to the corporation's right of action. 47
The Illinois Constitution provides that, "The right of trial by jury as
44. Goetz v. Manufacturers' & Traders' Trust Co., 154 Misc. 733, 277 N.Y. Supp.
802 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Metcalf v. Shamel, 166 Cal. 2d 789, 333 P.2d 857 (1959); Morton
v. Morton Realty Co., 41 Idaho 729, 241 P. 1014 (1925); Neff v. Barber, 162 N.W. 667(1917); Steinway v. Griffith Consol. Theaters, 273 P.2d 872 (Okla. 1954).
45. Farwell v. The Great Western Telegraph Co., 161 Ill. 522, 44 N.E. 891 (1896).
46. City of Chicago v. Cameron, 120 Ill. 447 (1887); Bruschke v. Der Nord Chicago
Schuetzer Verein, 145 Ill. 433 (1893); Schmidt v. Crowell-Collier Pub. Co., 349
Ill. App. 229, 110 N.E.2d 464 (1953).
47. 314 Ill. App. 496, 512; 42 N.E.2d 93, 102 (1942). It should be noted that in
Mcllvaine, the court said that "there is no common law right in stockholders or
creditors to sue derivatively in the name of the corporation." In facing the question
of creditors suing shareholders derivatively through the corporation, the Illinois Su-
preme Court said that there was no right to a jury trial because the action was
found only in equity. Parmalee v. Price, 208 Ill. 544, 70 N.E. 725 (1904); Golden v.
Cervenka, 278 Ill. 409, 116 N.E. 273 (1917). Since this is the other side of the
same "derivative" coin, it may be a good indication of how the Illinois courts would
handle the question of the right to a jury trial for a shareholder's derivative suit today.
330
1971 Right to Jury Trial
heretofore enjoyed, shall remain inviolate."4" The approach taken to
determine whether this right exists is determined by an examination
of the common law as it existed at the time the Illinois Constitution
was adopted.49 In applying this right, the Illinois Supreme Court has
limited it to traditionally recognized common law causes of action or
to actions where it has been specifically authorized by the Legislature.50
Illinois has eliminated the procedural distinctions between law and
equity,51 and legal and equitable issues can be tried together in one
action. 2 So in a situation where both legal and equitable issues have
been joined, and the court has determined that there is a right to a jury
trial on the legal issues, these issues must be separated from the equitable
ones as the chancellor can no longer maintain jurisdiction over them.55
The Illinois court has the discretion to determine whether or not the
legal and equitable issues are separable54 and in what order they will
be tried.55 In determining which issues are legal and which are equit-
able, the Illinois courts have held that where a declaration of rights alone
48. Ill. CONST. Art. I, sec. 13 (1970).
49. People v. Kelly, 347 Ill. 221, 179 N.E. 898 (1931); People v. Niesman, 356
Ill. 322, 190 N.E. 668 (1934); People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, 175 N.E. 400 (1931);
Stephens v. Kasten, 383 Ill. 127, 48 N.E.2d 383 (1943).
50. Weininger v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 359 Ill. 584, 195 N.E. 545
(1935); Fisher v. Burgiel, 382 Ill. 42, 46 N.E.2d 380 (1943); Lazarus v. Village of
Northbrook, 31 Ill. 2d 146, 199 N.E.2d 797 (1964). Houston v. Brackett, 38 111. App.
2d 463, 187 N.E.2d 545 (1963); Flaherty v. Murphy, 291 Ill. 595, 126 N.E. 553 (1920).
The Illinois Supreme Court has said that the jury trial is the favored mode of adjudica-
tion. Dept. of Public Works & Buildings v. Melling, 78 Ill. App. 2d 37, 222 N.E.2d
515 (1966). This feeling was adequately stated in Ney v. Yellow Cab, 2 Ill. 2d 74,
84, 117 N.E.2d 74, 80 (1954) where the Supreme Court said:
The right of trial by jury is recognized in the Magna Carta, our Declaration of
Independence, and both our State and Federal Constitutions. It is a funda-
mental right in our democratic judicial system. Questions which are composed
of such qualities sufficient to cause reasonable men to arrive at different re-
sults should never be determined as matters of law. The debatable quality of
issues such as negligence and proximate cause, the fact that fair-minded men
might reach different conclusions, emphasize the appropriateness and necessity
of leaving such questions to a fact finding body. The jury is the tribunal
under our legal system to decide that type of issue. To withdraw such ques-
tions from the jury is to usurp its functions.
51. I1. Civ. Pr. Act, Sec. 1.
The provisions of this Act apply to all civil proceedings, both at law and in
equity. . . . As to all matters not regulated by statute or rule of court, the
practice at common law and in equity prevails.
52. Ill. Civ. Pr. Act Sec. 44:
Joinder of causes of action and use of counter claims-Transfer from one
docket to another. (1) Subject to rules any plaintiff or plaintiffs may join
any cause of action, whether legal or equitable or both, against any defendant
or defendants. ...
53. Rozema v. Quinn, 51 Ill. App. 2d 479, 201 N.E.2d 649 (1964). The equity
court may grant a jury trial, but it will be advisory only. Highland Park v. Calder,
269 Ill. App. 255 (1932).
54. Ill. Sup. Ct. Rules 135 and 232.
55. Usually the courts follow the old Federal procedures of trying the equity issues
first, then the legal issues. Williams v. Northern Trust Co., 316 Ill. App. 148, 44 N.E
2d 333 (1942); Il. Civ. P. Act, Sec. 44.
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is sought, the jury right is determined by an examination of the disputed
issues and the characteristics of the facts which would indicate the ap-
propriateness of legal or equitable relief. However, where relief is
sought, the nature of the relief is determinative. 56
There is no case in Illinois comparable to Beacon or Dairy Queen hold-
ing that the legal issues are to be tried first to prevent the possible prob-
lem of estoppel because of a prior determination of common equitable
facts. Thus Illinois lacks the first step in any attempt to follow the
Ross analysis. It would seem that the court, if presented with a con-
troversy which included both legal and equitable issues, would deter-
mine any jury right by an examination of the individual remedies sought
along with the appropriate historical background. If the issues can be
separated, the court will do so upon a proper jury demand.
In the shareholder's derivative suit, the court would not look at the ba-
sic nature of the issue, but rather to the nature of the relief that the
shareholders are entitled to, the derivative suit, historically a unitary
action founded only in equity. Therefore, under present practice in Ii-
nois, the courts should deny a request for a jury trial on any factual is-
sues in the derivative suit.
WARREN J. MARWEDEL
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56. Lazarus v. Village of Northbrook, supra note 50, Beck v. Will County, 34
Ill. 2d 588, 218 N.E.2d 98 (1966).
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